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Abstract
We evaluate how governance uncertainty — exemplified by turnout uncertainty
—affects the trade off between internalization of externalities and political account-
ability in the design of the fiscal state. We show that centralization only weakens
political accountability in the presence of negative externalities. Unlike positive ex-
ternalities, negative externalities allow federal politicians to extract higher rents.
This yields two new insights. First, decentralization can only Pareto dominate cen-
tralization in economies with negative externalities. Second, centralization may not
be Pareto effi cient in economies with positive externalities despite the fact that pol-
icy can be tailored to regional taste differences and centralization internalizes the
positive externality.
Keywords: Fiscal federalism, local public goods, externalities, performance vot-
ing, turnout uncertainty, electoral accountability.
JEL Classifications: D72; D78; H41.
1 Introduction
Should a society apt for a centralized fiscal system where spending decisions are made
by a central authority and financed from general tax revenues or should it apt for a
decentralized system where fiscal choices are made by local authorities and financed by
local taxes? Oates (1972) answered this question in his Decentralization Theorem which
states that decentralization is desirable if externalities are weak and regional differences
in taste are large.1 The design of the fiscal state also entails many political economy trade
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under its research programme in Fiscal Federalism.
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1Harstad (2007) provides a rationale for why it might be politically optimal to select uniform federal
policies.
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offs.2 This paper contributes to the political economy of fiscal federalism by exploring how
governance uncertainty affects the trade offbetween internalization of externalities and the
perceived benefits of electoral accountability under regionalism. Governance uncertainty
arises when there is uncertainty about which region in a federation will determine the
outcome of federal elections.
The general framework of our analysis is the common agency model with governance
uncertainty studied by Aidt and Dutta (2004). This model portrays a society populated
by heterogenous groups of voters (e.g., living in different regions) with conflicting policy
preferences. The groups of voters (the principals) use elections to hold an opportunistic
politician (the agent) accountable for his policy choices while in offi ce. They do so by
voting retrospectively in an infinite sequence of elections, as in Ferejohn (1986), Persson
et al. (1997), Coate and Morris (1999), Aidt and Magris (2006), or Aidt and Dutta
(2007). The critical new feature of the analysis is that before each election the politician
is uncertain about which group will be pivotal in deciding the outcome of the election.
We call this governance uncertainty. Governance uncertainty has many different sources.
To be concrete, however, we relate it to randomness in the electoral turnout of voters in
different groups.3 These random turnout shocks introduce uncertainty from the point of
view of the politician as to which group holds the majority amongst those voters who
actually turn out to vote in any given election. An example is random fluctuations in
weather conditions. Such fluctuations can affect the turnout rate in some geographical
locations and not in others or keep certain types of voters, such as the poor, at home
(Roemer, 1998, and Gomez et al., 2007). Artés (2014), for example, reports that election
day rainfall decreases turnout in Spanish general elections and that high turnout harms the
conservatives and benefits the smaller parties. Lind (2014) also reports evidence that rain
on election day affects voter turnout and that this, in turn, affects the party composition
of the elected councils in Norwegian local elections. Along similar lines, Arnold and Freier
(2015) show that rain shocks affect turnout in the German state of North-RhineWestphalia
and that lower turnout benefits the conservatives and harms the social democrats. These
examples illustrate that random fluctuations in turnout, induced by rain shocks, can affect
election outcomes.
Based on this general framework, we develop a specific political economy model of fiscal
federalism in a country with two regions. Provision of local public goods in one region
has spillover effects on the other region. Centralization encourages internalization, but
introduces governance uncertainty because the federal politician cannot know for sure ex
ante which of the two regions will decide his reelection. We use this model to study when
provision of local public goods should be centralized? The model also provides insights
into the forces that stabilize and destabilize federal fiscal structures.
2We discuss this literature in Section 2.
3Dhillon and Peralta (2002) survey the literature on voter turnout. Aldashev (2015) studies the link
between political rents and voter turnout.
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The main result of the analysis is an asymmetry between positive and negative exter-
nalities with regard to how much rent politicians in a federation can extract. With negative
externalities, a federal politician can extract more rents from his citizens than the collec-
tive of regional politicians. With positive externalities, this is not the case. Intuitively, the
asymmetry arises because it is more expensive for the federal politician to keep all regions
satisfied when public goods provided in one region exhibit a negative externality than when
the externality is positive. To avoid being “ignored”when fiscal externalities are negative,
voters in the two regions must accept that the federal politician collects higher rents than
with positive externalities. In the presence of negative externalities, the classical result
that federalism is better for citizens than regionalism can even be turned on its head. Since
federal politicians can extract more rents, federalism can be worse than regionalism for
all citizens, despite the fact that regionalism does not internalize the negative external-
ity. With positive externalities, federal politicians are not able to extract additional rents.
This implies, in sharp contrast to the case with negative externalities, that regionalism
cannot Pareto dominate federalism. The reason is that externalities get internalized with
federalism, which is good for all voters. The only downside of federalism is that the federal
politician may be induced to redistribute, but that, by definition, benefits one region at
the expense of the other.
Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 presents the general political com-
mon agency model with governance uncertainty. Section 4 presents the equilibrium char-
acterization results from Aidt and Dutta (2004). Section 5 tailors the general model to the
case of local public goods and fiscal federalism and presents the main results of the paper.
Section 6 discusses the implications for fiscal integration and disintegration. Section 7
summarizes and discusses a number of extensions. The supplementary online appendix
contains complete proofs of all propositions and details on robustness checks related to
distortionary taxation.
2 Related Literature
The paper is most directly related to the work by Seabright (1996), Tommasi and Wein-
schelbaum (2007), Bordignon et al. (2008), and Hindriks and Lockwood (2009).4 Seabright
(1996) argues that political accountability is weakened when fiscal decisions are central-
ized. The reason is that politicians only need to win a simple majority of regions in a
federal election and this allows them to capture more rents at the federal level than at the
regional level. Our analysis also suggests that accountability is lower when fiscal decisions
are centralized, but it differs in two regards. Firstly, Seabright (1996) measures the ac-
countability effect as the reduction in the probability that a given region can determine the
reelection of the government. In contrast, we conceptualize the political clout of a region
4Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) and Lockwood (2006) survey the literature on the political economy of
fiscal federalism.
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by the probability that voters of that region holds the majority among those who turn out
to vote in the federation. Importantly, we show that the accountability effect depends on
the nature of the externalities associated with provision of local public goods. Although an
asymmetry between the net benefit of centralization with positive and negative external-
ities can also be found in Lockwood (2002), the observation that electoral accountability
operates differently under the two types externalities is a new insight which is not captured
in the previous literature. Second, Seabright (1996) does not explicitly model the benefits
of centralization (he simply assumes that ego-rents are higher in a federation). Our analy-
sis explicitly models the benefit of centralization related to internalization of externalities.
We emphasize the trade off between loss of accountability and internalization of external
costs.
Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007) and Bordignon et al. (2008) study fiscal federal-
ism in a common agency model. They allow the citizens of the regions within the country
to offer monetary rewards to either the federal politician (under federalism) or to the re-
gional politicians (under regionalism).5 They identify a trade offbetween internalization of
externalities and the coordination failure that arises when fiscal decisions are centralized.
One can interpret the trade off that we highlight in a similar way. One key difference,
however, is that we focus on the implicit incentives provided by elections rather than the
explicit incentives provided by monetary payments. Like us, Bordignon et al. (2008) find
that the distinction between positive and negative externalities matters. The reason is,
however, very different: lobbying under regionalism may partly compensate for the fact
that local public goods are under-provided, but only if the externality is positive.
Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) stress that voters are often poorly informed about policy
outcomes. In addition to their disciplining role, elections can, therefore, serve as a selection
devise. As in our context, fiscal centralization may reduce electoral accountability, but this
effect is counteracted by a selection effect that encourages “bad”incumbents to pretend to
be “good”. Our analysis abstracts from selection in order to stress the effect of governance
uncertainty on electoral accountability, but future work could consider adding an adverse
selection component to the framework.
Besley and Coate (2003) identify two important political effects of centralization. Both
are related to the legislative procedures operating at the federal level. First, centralization
makes it uncertain whether or not the representative from a particular region will be in-
cluded in the minimum winning coalition that determines federal policy. Second, regional
voters may have an incentive to delegate strategically and elect a politician who cares
more about public spending than they do to represent them at the federal level. In both
cases, centralization involves a trade off between the political distortion (uncertainty or
strategic delegation) and the benefits of internalizing (positive) externalities. Besley and
Coate (2003) find that centralization is, typically, beneficial if the externality is strong
5Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007) assume that the set of lobby groups is fixed. Redoano (2010)
shows the number of lobby groups varies with the level of centralization.
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enough.6 Lülfesmann et al. (2015) argue that Besley and Coate (2003) underplay the
scope for bargaining amongst regions and show that decentralization tends to dominate
centralization when this is taken into account.7 Like Besley and Coate (2003), we focus
on the uncertainty that arises when fiscal decisions are centralized, but we stress gover-
nance uncertainty rather than uncertainty about being included in the minimum winning
coalition. It is interesting to notice that decentralization, in our model, can only Pareto
dominate centralization in the presence of a negative externality —a case that Besley and
Coate (2003) do not consider.
Lockwood (2002) argues that centralization leads to ineffi cient outcomes when regional
representatives vote over agendas that contain sets of region-specific projects. The rea-
son is that the political choice is not tailored suffi ciently to within-region benefits. Thus,
centralization entails a classical trade off between catering for regional differences and in-
ternalizing externalities. Importantly, however, the political distortions imply that weaker
externalities and greater heterogeneity between regions need not increase the effi ciency
gain from decentralizations. In our model, there is no regional differences with regard to
the benefits of public goods. Nonetheless, we find an interesting asymmetry between pos-
itive and negative externalities which provides a complementary example of how politics
can change the classical trade offs in surprising ways. Lockwood (2008) further explores
ways in which the Decentralization Theorem may break down under majority voting even
when federal policy, by assumption, cannot reflect regional preferences.
3 A General Model of Governance Uncertainty
Society consists of two groups of voters, i = 1, 2; politicians are indexed by 0. A group
is defined as a subset of voters who are affected in the same way by public policy. In the
context of fiscal federalism, the groups represent two regions within a federation. Per-





βtuit; i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. (1)
There are n1 voters in group 1 and n2 voters in group 2. We assume that n1 ≥ n2 and
define n = n1 + n2.
Each period, the politician collects taxes up to a maximum of T , spends some of this
on providing amenities to his electorate, and keeps the rest for himself as rent. Denoting
the cost of providing utilities to the two groups of voters by ct, we can write the politician’s
per-period payoff as
u0t = T − ct (2)
6Dur and Roelfsema (2005) show that centralization may fail to internalize externalities if the cost of
public goods cannot be shared among the regions.
7Similar conclusions are reached by Cheikbossian (2000) and Lülfesmann (2002).
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if in offi ce, and u0t = 0 otherwise.
The cost of providing utility to voters is determined by the political cost function. We
define C(x1t, x2t) as the minimum cost to the politician of providing utility levels u1t ≥ x1t
and u2t ≥ x2t simultaneously to voters in the two groups. Likewise, we define Ci(xit) as
the minimum cost of providing the utility level uit ≥ xit to group i, i = 1, 2, in isolation.
We begin by specifying the political cost function directly, but shall derive it from more
fundamental considerations in the application to fiscal federalism that follows. We make
the following assumptions.





t ⇒ C(xt) ≥ C(x′t)
xit > x
′
it ⇒ Ci(xit) ≥ Ci(x′it)
where xt = (x1t,x2t). Further, limxi→∞C(x1, x2) = limxi→∞Ci(xit) =∞.





The first assumption says that it is costly for the politician to generate utility for each
group of voters. This is clearly the case whenever tax resources that could otherwise have
been extracted as rents have to be devoted to the task. However, when the politician
can provide public goods, the cost functions may not be strictly increasing. The second
assumption rules out discontinuities in the cost of generating utilities. Both of these
assumptions can be relaxed.
The property of the political cost function that really matters is whether it is sub- or
super-additive. The political cost function is sub-additive if
(C+) C(x1t, x2t) ≤ C1(x1t) + C2(x2t) (3)
and super-additive if
(C−) C(x1t, x2t) > C1(x1t) + C2(x2t). (4)
A sub-additive political cost function makes it cheaper to provide utility to all voters jointly
than to provide the same utility levels to the two groups separately. In public finance, sub-
additivity is, typically, associated with pure public goods or positive externalities. A super-
additive cost function makes it more expensive to please all groups of voters jointly than
to please them separately. Super-additivity is caused by negative externalities associated
with, for example, provision of local public goods, pollution, or envy effects.
The politician, elected at t, cannot make binding promises on the level and pattern of
public spending before he enters offi ce. Since his own payoff decreases with ct, he would,
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in the absence of electoral incentives, choose ct = 0 and provide no amenities to the
electorate. Voters know this, and threaten to vote retrospectively against a politician who
does not provide them with a minimum level of utility. At the beginning of each period,
voters in each group announce simultaneously a performance standard, denoted x1t and
x2t. They then vote in favor of reelection of the incumbent politician if, and only if the
policy implementation observed at the end of the period generates at least that level of
utility, i.e., if, and only if uit ≥ xit.
The key feature of the model is that politicians are exposed to governance uncertainty.
At the most general level this means that the incumbent cannot be sure ex ante which
of the two groups is decisive in determining his reelection. Governance uncertainty can
arise for many reasons. A leading example is electoral turnout uncertainty, and this is the
interpretation we shall follow here for concreteness. In particular, we assume that none of
the groups can guarantee to turn out in full force at elections. Consequently, a politician
may deliver on the performance standard set by group 1, who, say, holds the majority
ex ante, by incurring the cost C1(x1t), but fail to deliver on the standard set by group 2
(u2t < x2t). On the day of the election, ñit voters from group i actually show up to vote,
and the politician can lose his bid for reelection if ñ2t > ñ1t. The central assumption of our
analysis is that electoral turnout is uncertain, and that individual voters vote according
to the announced performance standards if they show up to vote, but that they cannot, as
a group, guarantee a particular turnout rate. This is captured by the next assumption.
Assumption 3 Electoral turnout, ñt = (ñ1t, ñ2t), is random. The ex ante probability
that the turnout of group 1 is greater than that of group 2, P (ñ1t ≥ ñ2t), is equal to p1
and constant over time. The complementary probability is p2 = 1 − p1. We assume that
p1 ∈ (0, 1).
It is important that neither group can guarantee reelection. This is more likely to be
the case when turnout shocks are correlated within groups and when differences in group
sizes are not too large.
We stress that governance uncertainty can arise for many other reasons than turnout
uncertainty. It may, for example, reflect fluctuations in inter-group power relations with
one group becoming more powerful and, therefore, more pivotal than another due to
unpredictable events. The lobbying power of social groups may fluctuate in this way. Under
this interpretation, the probability of being pivotal, pi, is a manifestation of randomness
in the cost of political mobilization. Combined with the insights from Olson (1965), a
minority could be as likely as a majority group to be pivotal, not because it may in fact
hold the majority among those who turn out to vote, but because it is better at organizing
an effective lobby group. Another example is random preferences. Suppose that some
people like education spending while others want spending on care for the elderly and that
the proportions of individuals of these two types fluctuate in unpredictable ways. In this
case, pi represents the probability that one of the “preference types”is pivotal.
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The game between the incumbent politician and the two groups of voters unfolds
over time as follows. At the beginning of each period, voters in each group announce the
(utility) standard that the politician needs to satisfy to get their votes in the next election.
The standards are chosen by the two groups non-cooperatively and at the same time.
The politician observes the standards and determines whether to comply, and if so, how
many standards to meet. We denote the set of actions available to the politician by A =
{(00), (10), (01), (11)} with elements at = (00) (meet neither standard); at = (10) (meet
group 1’s standard only); at = (01) (meet group 2’s standard only); and at = (11) (meet
both standards). At the end of the period, a new election is held and voters randomly turn
out to vote. Those who turn out vote according to the announced performance standard.
The politician either wins or loses. In the latter case, he is replaced by an identical
challenger; in the former case, he gets (at least) another term in offi ce. After the election,
the game continues to the next period where a similar sequence of events takes place. We
restrict attention to history-independent subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game. In
addition, we assume that the politician, if indifferent between two or more actions (which
are then preferred to the remaining ones), chooses the action that maximizes his reelection
chance. Below, when we refer to equilibrium, this is what we mean.
4 Equilibrium Paths
The political agency model presented above is a special case of the general model studied
in Aidt and Dutta (2004). We can, therefore, apply Theorem 1 from that paper to charac-
terize the set of equilibria.8 The Theorem says that all equilibrium paths of the political
game described above have a property called strategic consensus: the politician prefers to
meet all performance standards at all times, all those voters who turn out to vote in the
election vote for the incumbent, and the incumbent is reelected with certainty, irrespective
of turnout shocks. While this outcome, perhaps, is to be expected when the political cost
function is sub-additive and it is cheaper for the politician to satisfy the standards jointly
than separately, it is surprising that the same result obtains with super-additive costs. In
this case, the fact that it is more expensive to satisfy the standards jointly than separately
suggests that “partisan”outcomes would be more likely. This intuition is, however, wrong.
To grasp logic behind the consensus result, consider the special case where the only
policy instrument is a group-specific transfer. This makes the political cost function ad-
ditive. To please voters, the politician must either be partisan and give transfers to one
group only or seek consensus and give to both. The two groups of voters announce their
standards simultaneously. Suppose that group 1 announces a standard that is so high
that the politician prefers to take his chances and offer transfers only to group 2. This
cannot be an equilibrium. This is because group 1 gets nothing and it would do better by
8Supplementary online appendix I restates Theorem 1 in a slightly generalized form along with a proof
tailored to the political agency model.
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reducing its standard to a level such that it is in the best interest of the politician to offer
it a transfer. In other words, whenever the politician is willing to implement a “partisan”
policy, the disfavored group has an incentive to lower its standard to induce the politician
to implement a “partisan”policy in its favor. This logic continues until the standards are
such that the politician is just willing to implement a policy that satisfies both groups.
The result is strategic consensus. Importantly, it does not follow from this logic that the
two groups will “under-bid”each other until the politician captures the entire rent. This
would only happen if the two groups were “perfect substitutes” in the sense that either
of them can guarantee reelection for sure (see Ferejohn, 1986). In our model, however,
the two groups of voters avoid Bertrand-style competition precisely because they are not
“perfect substitutes” from the point of view of the politician: both are needed to secure
reelection with certainty. As a consequence, voters retain some control power. A similar
logic applies when the political cost function is either sub- or super-additive.
Although all equilibrium paths display strategic consensus, the distribution of payoffs
depends critically on the properties of the political cost function. Let X = {x1t, x2t}∞t=0
be a sequence of equilibrium performance standards. In an economy with sub-additive
political costs, the following characterization result holds.
Proposition 1 (Sub-additive Costs) If the political cost functions satisfy assumptions
[M ] and [K] and are sub-additive, then X must satisfy
(SC+1 ) C(x1t, x2t) = βT ;
(SC+2 ) C1(x1t) ≥ βp1T ;
(SC+3 ) C2(x2t) ≥ βp2T.
Moreover, (SC+2 ) and (SC
+
3 ) hold with equality for additive political cost functions. Along
all equilibrium paths, the politician receives payoffs (1− β)T per period.
The politician always gets per period payoff (1 − β)T , while the remaining share of
tax revenues, βT , is devoted to generate utilities to voters. Importantly, this distribution
of resources is unaffected by turnout uncertainty. Thus, strategic consensus provides the
politician with “full insurance”against random voter turnout and voters with insurance
against “partisan”choices by the politician. When the political cost function is additive,
the payoffs are uniquely determined by p1 and p2. In contrast, economies with strictly sub-
additive costs exhibit multiple equilibria in performance standards at each t. Moreover,
any equilibrium allocation what arises with sub-additive costs (weakly) Pareto dominates
the utility allocation with additive costs.
In an economy with super-additive political costs, the utility allocation is very different,
as shown by the second characterization result.
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Proposition 2 (Super-additive Costs) If the political cost functions satisfy assump-
tions [M ] and [K] and are super-additive, then X must satisfy
(SC−1 ) C(x1t, x2t)(1 + η1)− C1(x1) = η1T
(SC−2 ) C(x1t, x2t)(1 + η2)− C2(x2) = η2T
where ηi =
(1−pi)β
1−β for i = 1, 2. The politician receives payoffs T − C(x1t, x2t) > (1 − β)T
every period. Moreover, if the cost functions are differentiable and ∂C
∂x1∂x2
> 0, then the
solution to (SC−1 ) and (SC
−
2 ) is unique.
With super-additive political costs, the politician receives more than he receives along
any equilibrium path with sub-additive costs, but his payoff is no longer independent
of turnout shocks. Intuitively, super-additive costs make it costly for the politician to
implement consensus outcomes. This enables him to extract more rent: the two groups of
voters have to lower their standards to prevent “partisan”outcomes.
5 A Specific Model of Fiscal Federalism
We now tailor the general model to fiscal federalism. We consider a country with two
regions, i = 1, 2, inhabited by ni voters and with n1 ≥ n2. Voters in each region derive
utility from local public goods git and private goods yit. Consumption of local public goods
in one region generates externalities for voters in the other region. To capture this, we
write the utility function of a typical voter living in region i as
uit = yit + git − γg−it. (5)
The parameter γ ∈ (−1, n2
n1
) captures the strength of the externality: γ > 0 corresponds to





where kit is the input required to produce the public good, bought at a constant price
of one.9 The maximum revenue that can be collected each period in region i is Ti. The
maximum revenue that can be collected in the country is T = T1+T2. As in Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000), we can interpret these limits as the result of convex deadweight costs: up
to Ti revenues can be collected at zero cost, while revenues beyond this are prohibitively
costly to collect. We return to the question of distortionary taxation in Section 7. We use
the convention that politicians raise the maximum revenue each period, spent some of it
9We can relax the assumption of a linear utility function and the Cobb-Douglas specification of the
production function. What we need is that the policy functions are concave.
10
on providing local public goods, some on transfers sit > 0 to voters, and keep the rest as
rent.10
We compare two institutional arrangements: Regionalism [R] and federalism [F ]. Re-
gionalism means that each region elects a regional politician who can finance local public
goods, transfers, and rents out of local tax revenues. Federalism means that a single
elected politician is in charge of the whole country. The federal politician uses general tax
revenues to provide public goods and transfers to the two regions, and to fund rents for
himself.
The key assumption is that there is uncertainty at the federal level about which of
the two regions will hold the majority in each election. Such uncertainty is, by definition,
not present under regionalism. The ex ante probability that voters in region i holds the
majority among those who turn out to vote in a federal election is pi with p1 = 1 − p2.
Again, we stress that turnout uncertainty is not the only valid interpretation. For example,
pi can also be interpreted as a power index that captures the influence of region i in
federal decisions. All regions may be pivotal occasionally because of random shifts in
power relations, but some regions are more likely to be pivotal than others. In practise,
many federal constitutions include mechanisms to protect minorities and smaller regions.
This often involves having an upper chamber where regions have equal representation
rather than representation in relation to population size. This suggests that governance
uncertainty can be induced by constitutional features that aim at protecting minorities.
5.1 Utilitarian Planners
As a benchmark, suppose that all public finance decisions were made by utilitarian plan-
ners. Under regionalism, two regional planners decide simultaneously how much local
public good to provide to their region. They do so by maximizing regional aggregate
public goods surplus:






−it)− kit, i = 1, 2 (7)
subject to the regional revenue constraint and taking the spending decision in the other
region as given. In a federation, on the other hand, decisions are made by one utilitarian
planner. He maximizes aggregate public goods surplus, i.e., sFt (k1t, k2t) =
∑
sRit(.) subject
to the total tax revenues raised from the two regions. The public goods surplus cannot
be lower under federalism than under regionalism and for γ 6= 0, the surplus is strictly
larger. Since utility is linear in income (and in transfers), the federal planner does not care
about redistribution of income across the two regions. These two points together imply
that the federal planner, for all γ 6= 0, is able and willing to devise a tax sharing rule such
10Another interpretation is that the politicians set the gross tax rate that collects the maximum revenue
and then give voters a tax rebate which determines what the net tax rate is. So, in this restricted sense,
taxation is endogenous.
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that federalism Pareto dominates regionalism.11 The intuition is straightforward. With
benevolent planners, centralization does not create or eliminate political distortions and
federal and regional planners are equality good at catering to local tastes. Moreover, the
federal planner is indifferent to redistribution of income but is, unlike the regional planners,
willing to internalize externalities. Hence, federalism Pareto dominates regionalism. This
provides a clear-cut benchmark against which we measure political distortions.
5.2 The Political Cost Functions
To characterize equilibrium allocations, we derive the political cost functions. We focus
on the situation in which both federal and regional politicians provide local public goods
and transfers at equilibrium. This requires that tax revenues are suffi ciently large.12
Under regionalism, the two regional politicians face a separate performance standard.
They make decisions about public spending without (direct) regard for the welfare of
voters in the other region. Consider the politician in region i who in period t faces the
performance standard xit. The minimum cost of satisfying this standard, for a given input
to the production of local public goods in the other region, is
C(xit; k−i) = min
kit≥0,sit≥0
kit + nisit (8)






−it and the regional budget constraint. It follows that
kit = (ni)
2 and sit = xit − 2(ni − γn−i). The political cost functions are
CRi (xit) = (ni)
2 + ni(xit − 2(ni − γn−i)) for i = 1, 2. (9)
We notice that the externality is not internalized: both regions spend on local public goods
up to the point where the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost for that region.
The transfer must, therefore, “compensate” regional voters for the impact of spending
on local public goods in the other region. In each region, voters set the performance
standard in period t taking the standard of the other region as given. At equilibrium,
the standards make each regional politician indifferent between satisfying the standard
and getting reelected (for sure) and not satisfying it. In the latter case, he is replaced





− ni + 2(ni − γn−i) for i = 1, 2. (10)
The politician of region i keeps a share, (1 − β)Ti, of regional tax revenues each period,
and uses the rest to provide local public goods and transfers to voters of his region. A
11For γ = 0, the institutional arrangement makes no difference. Supplementary online appendix II
derives the sharing rule.
12See Supplementary online appendix II for details.
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negative externality reduces voters’welfare (γ > 0), while a positive externality (γ < 0)
enhances their well-being, as one would expect.
Under federalism, the single federal politician faces the performance standards {x1t, x2t}
set by voters in the two regions. He minimizes the cost of satisfying the two standards
jointly by spending kit = (ni − n−iγ)2 on local public goods and by providing transfers
sit = xit − 2ni (1 + γ2) + 4γn−i to voters in each of the two regions. The political cost
function is, therefore, given by


















If the politician decides to satisfy the standard of one of the regions, say, region i, only,
then it is clear that s−it = 0. However, if local public goods generate a positive externality
(γ < 0), it is cost effective to provide some local public goods to region −i. This is
not because the politician cares about the welfare of voters in that region as such, but
because it is, up to a point, cheaper to provide utility to voters in region i this way than
to give them transfers. Hence, for γ < 0, the cost minimizing choice of spending on local
public goods is kit = (ni)
2 and k−it = (niγ)
2 and the transfer to each voter of group i is
xit− 2ni(1 + γ2). If, on the other hand, local public goods generate negative externalities,
then k−it = 0 and the politician spends kit = (ni)
2 on local public goods to region i and
provides the voters of that region with the transfer sit = xit− 2ni. With this in mind, the
political cost functions are:
CFi (xit) = (ni)






2 + ni(xit − 2ni(1 + γ2)) for γ < 0. (13)




CFi (xit) = 4n2n1γ < 0, (14)




CFi (xit) = γ
(
4n1n2 − γ(n21 + n22
)
) > 0. (15)
The political cost function is sub-additive for γ < 0 and additive for γ = 0. For γ > 0,





as (3n21 − n22) n2n1 > 0 for
n1 ≥ n2.
Below we apply Propositions 1 and 2 to characterize stationary equilibrium allocations.
Our main goal is to compare regime [F] and [R] under different assumptions about the
magnitude of the externality. We use Pareto effi ciency as our welfare criterion. In doing
so, we adopt a voter-centric approach and exclude the rents captured by the politicians.
13
That is, we say that regime [F] Pareto dominates [R] if all voters prefer [F] to [R]. This
approach has several advantages. Firstly, in contrast to a criterion based on aggregate
public goods surplus, the Pareto criterion has a clear-cut positive implication. If one
institutional arrangement Pareto dominates another, all voters would support a change
in a referendum.13 Secondly, the comparisons are not distorted by whether politicians
can extract more or less rent. Since rent is pure social waste in our model, this seems a
reasonable choice from a normative point of view. However, from a positive point of view,
it is interesting also to study how regional politicians, who may have a disproportionate
say in whether centralization takes place or not, rank the different regimes. We do so in
Section 6.
5.3 No Externalities
We begin by considering the case without externalities. In this case, political costs are
additive and the total rent ((1−β)T ) captured by the federal politician is equal to the sum
of those captured by the two regional politicians ((1− β)T1 + (1− β)T2). An implication,
then, is that the only effect of centralization is to allow redistribution between the regions.
With additive political costs, centralization is a zero-sum game. If one region gains, it
must be at the expense of the other. Consequently, the two regimes cannot be Pareto
ranked.
Proposition 3 (No externalities γ = 0) Regime [F] and [R] cannot be Pareto ranked.




for i = 1, 2.
Proof. Use Proposition 1 to derive the equilibrium utility allocation in regime [F]:
xFit(γ = 0) =
βpiT
ni
+ ni for i = 1, 2.
The utility differences between regime [F] and [R] are
xFit(γ = 0)− xRit = n−1i β (Tpi − Ti) = n−1i β(piT−i − p−iTi) ≡ ∆̂i for i = 1, 2. (16)
where xRit is defined by equation (10). The proposition follows because ∆̂1 > 0⇔ ∆̂2 < 0
Voters in region i receives piβT
ni
+ ni from the federal politician and
βTi
ni
+ ni from the
regional politician. Intuitively, therefore, whether a region gains or not from centralization
depends on pi — the probability that each region holds the majority among those who
turn out to vote in the federal election —relative to the region’s contribution to federal
tax revenues. In the absence of externalities, centralization tends to be favored by poor
regions or by regions that are likely to be pivotal in federal decision making.
13See Crémer and Palfrey (1996), Lockwood (2004), Feld et al. (2008), Schnellenbach et al. (2010) or
Galletta and Jametti (2015) for studies of federalism and direct democracy.
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5.4 Negative Externalities
The situation is more interesting when local public goods generate a negative externality
(γ > 0) and political costs are super-additive. In this case, centralization is associated with
three effects. The first effect is the redistribution effect described above: centralization
pools revenues from the two regions. This allows redistribution to take place. The second
effect is the internalization effect : the federal politician internalizes the externality in order
to minimize the cost of getting reelected. This benefits all voters. The third effect is the
rent effect. This effect is new to the literature and arises because political costs are super-
additive. Recall from Proposition 2 that the federal politician’s share of total revenues, at
equilibrium, is larger than (1−β)T . This implies that less is available in total to generate
amenities to voters under federalism than under regionalism. This harms all voters. The
next proposition isolates the externality and rent effect from the redistribution effect by
assuming that p1 = 12 and that T1 = T2.
Proposition 4 (Negative Externalities γ > 0) Let θ = n1
n2
≥ 1. Assume that p1 = 12
and T1 = T2. Then for β >
(1+θ)(θ−1)
2(3θ2−1)
1. [R] is Pareto superior to [F] for γ ∈ (0, 4(1−β)θ
(2−β)(1+θ2)
).
2. [F] is Pareto superior to [R] for γ ∈ ( 4(1−β)θ
(2−β)(1+θ2)
, θ−1).
Proof. Use Proposition 2 and equations (11) and (12) to derive the (unique) stationary
utility allocation under [F ]:
xFit (γ > 0) =
βpiT + n
2
i + γ (1− βpi)
(
γn2−i − 4nin−i + γn2i
)
ni
for i = 1, 2.
The utility differences between regime [F] and [R] are
∆it = x
F
it (γ > 0)− xRit = ∆̂i +
γ
(
γ (1− βpi) (n2i + n2−i)− 2nin−i(1− 2βpi)
)
ni
for i = 1, 2,
















We note that∆it ≥ 0⇔ ∆−it ≥ 0. In particular, ∆it < 0 for i = 1, 2 for γ ∈ (0, 4(1−β)θ(2−β)(1+θ2))
and (weakly) positive for γ ∈ [ 4(1−β)θ
(2−β)(1+θ2)
, θ−1)where θ = n1
n2
. We note that 4(1−β)θ
(2−β)(1+θ2)
<
θ−1 ⇔ β > (1+θ)(θ−1)
2(3θ2−1)
. Thus, the condition in the statement of the proposition ensures that




With negative externalities, centralization might be worse for all voters despite the
fact that regionalism fails to internalize externalities and does not have any advantage in
catering for heterogenous tastes. This stands in sharp contrast to the benchmark case with
utilitarian social planners where federalism Pareto dominates regionalism.
The source of this new and surprising result is the rent effect. It implies that the federal
politician can, in total, extract more rent than the two regional politicians together. The
underlying logic is as follows. With negative externalities, the federal politician must, in
part, internalize the externality that provision of local public goods to one region imposes
on the other and vice versa if he wants to be reelected by voters in both regions. It follows
that fewer public goods are provided under federalism than under regionalism and that
voters cannot ask for as much utility from the federal politician as they could from the
regional politicians. This, in turn, allows the federal politician to retain more rent.
The rent effect dominates the internalization effect for weak externalities. In this case,
both regions are worse off in a federation. However, for γ > 4(1−β)θ
(2−β)(1+θ2)
, the externality
effect is suffi ciently strong to dominate the rent effect, and federalism Pareto dominates
regionalism. The threshold that determines which effect dominates is decreasing in the
relative size of region 1 (θ = n1
n2
). This means that two unequal-sized regions are more
likely to benefit from joining a federation than two equal-sized regions. This is because it
is relatively expensive for a regional politician to compensate his voters through transfers
for any un-internalized externalities when the two regions are of unequal size.
The result that centralization is effi cient only with strong negative externalities echoes
the classical argument by Oates (1972). The logic, however, is entirely different. Oates
focused on the trade off between internalizing externalities and catering for differences in
the taste for public goods in different regions. The trade off behind Proposition 4 has
nothing to do with heterogenous taste. It is driven by the rent effect. Centralization
implies a transfer of resources from voters in the two regions to the federal politician. This
is why centralization is not in the interest of any voter if externalities are weak.
Proposition 4 ignores the redistribution effect. This effect, as we noted above, is driven
by turnout uncertainty as captured by pi and differences in tax resources in the two regions.
With the redistribution effect, we can define the values of p1 for which the two regions are
indifferent between the two regimes as:
p11(γ, λ) =
βλT2 + γ (2n1n2 − γ(n21 + n22))




2(1− β)(n21 + n22)− 2γ(1− 2β)n1n2
β (T2 (1 + λ) + (4n1n2 − γ(n21 + n22)) γ)
; (18)
where λ = T1
T2
. Region 1 prefers regime [F] to [R] if, and only if p1 > p11(γ, λ) and region
2 prefers regime [F] to [R] if, and only if p1 < p21(γ, λ). The two functions, p
1
1(γ, λ) and
p21(γ, λ), are drawn in Figure 1 in (γ, p1) space for a given value of λ. We can identify
two main areas. In area 1, regime [R] Pareto dominates [F], while in area 2, the opposite
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Figure 1: Welfare analysis with super-additive political costs and redistribution. Note:
Area 1: regionalism is Pareto superior; Area 2: federalism is Pareto superior.
is true. Outside these areas, the redistribution effect is suffi ciently strong to make one of
the regions better off at the expense of the other. An increase in λ (which makes region
1 relatively richer) shifts p11(γ, λ) and p
2
1(γ, λ) up. This makes it less likely that region 1
and more likely that region 2 benefits from federalism.
5.5 Positive Externalities
The situation with positive externalities is very different. In this case, political costs are
sub-additive and Proposition 1 shows that there exists multiple equilibria under federalism.
Along all equilibrium paths, the aggregate utility of the two regions is, however, uniquely
determined by











Moreover, the lower bounds on the utility of region i is xi ≥ 1ni (βpiT + n
2
i (1 + γ
2)). The
federal politician collects the rent (1− β)T each period. This is the same as the total rent
collected by the two regional politicians: there is no rent effect with sub-additive costs.
In the absence, then, of redistribution effects (i.e., for p1 = 12 , T1 = T2), one might expect
that centralization is always a Pareto improvement because externalities are internalized.
The next proposition, which assumes away the redistribution effect, shows that this is not
the case. To state this surprising result, we denote region 1’s share of total utility by ϕ
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and index equilibrium allocations by ϕ. We also, for simplicity and without loss of any
important insights, assume that n1 = n2 = 1. In this case ϕ = x1tβT+2(1−γ)2 .
Proposition 5 (Positive externalities γ < 0) Assume that p1 = 12 , T1 = T2, n1 =
n2 = 1 and γ < 0. Then there exists a ϕ ∈ (0, 12) such that for ϕ ∈ [ϕ, 1 − ϕ], regime [F]
Pareto dominates regime [R].
Corollary 1 There exist equilibria in which regime [F] does not Pareto dominate regime
[R].
Corollary 2 Regime [R] can never Pareto dominate regime [F].
Proof. Use Proposition 1 to calculate the “best”and the “worst”equilibrium alloca-
tion for each region in regime [F]:
xmaxit = piβT + 1 + γ
2 − 4γ
xminit = βpiT + 1 + γ
2
for i = 1, 2. Region i is better off under [R] than under [F] in the “worst”equilibrium if
xminit − xRit = ∆̂i + γ2 + 2γ < 0,
and is better off under [F] than under [R] in the “best”equilibrium if
xmaxit − xRit = ∆̂i + γ2 − 2γ > 0,
where ∆̂i is defined in equation (16). For p1 = 12 and T1 = T2, we see that x
min
it − xRit < 0
and xmaxit − xRit > 0 for i = 1, 2. Thus, at least one region prefers [F] to [R]. Along any
equilibrium path
x1t + x2t = βT + 2(1− γ)2. (20)
Define the share of total utility obtained by region i by ϕi. Region i is then indifferent
between the two regimes for
ϕi =
βTi + 1− 2γ
βT + 2(1− γ)2 ≡ ϕi.
Note that for T1 = T2, 0 < ϕ1 < 1 − ϕ2 < 1 and that ϕ1 = ϕ2 < 12 . Since
∑
i ϕi = 1, we
conclude that for ϕ1 ∈ (ϕ1, 1− ϕ2) both regions prefer [F] to [R]. Substitution of ϕ1 = ϕ
and ϕ1 = ϕ yields the proposition
In the absence of the rent and redistribution effect, it is surprising that centralization
is not always effi cient. The reason is that the selection of equilibria re-opens the door
to redistribution. For example, in the “worst”equilibrium under regime [F], the external
benefit captured by region 1 is γ2. This is less that what it “receives”under regime [R],
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Figure 2: Utility allocations with sub-additive political costs.
namely −2γ. The point is that in this equilibrium most of the internalization benefits are
captured by region 2. As a consequence, region 1 is better off with the “external”benefits
unintentionally bestowed upon it by region 2 under regionalism. This —and the proposition
more generally —is illustrated in Figure 2. It shows the utility allocations attainable in
region [F]. The segment A−B, indicated with boldface on the utility frontier, contains the
equilibrium allocations that Pareto dominate regionalism (represented by point R). The
remaining allocations on the frontier cannot be Pareto ranked. In these cases, contrary
to the Decentralization Theorem, it is not effi cient to centralize despite the absence of
regional differences in tastes and the presence of positive externalities.
Another important implication is that regionalism cannot ever Pareto dominate fed-
eralism. This stands in sharp contrast to the case with negative externalities discussed
above. The reason for this is that the federal politician is unable to extract more rent
than the collective of regional politicians: the rent effect is only present with negative
externalities. The intuition is that positive externalities makes it “cheaper”for the federal
politician to satisfy the demands of all voters. This, in turn, enables them to demand
more without risking being ignored.
6 Integration and Disintegration of Federations
Our analysis can speak directly to the forces that create and destroy federations. Logically,
fiscal integration among otherwise independent regions must either be fully voluntary or
forced upon reluctant regions by more powerful neighbors. Voluntary integration leads to
a stable fiscal structure, while forced integration is unstable with a tendency to break down
over time. Leading examples of the former include Switzerland, where the independent
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Cantons in 1848 agreed to form a federation, and the United States in the formative
years. As an example of the latter one may point to the United Kingdom. England has
traditionally played the leading role within the Union, but over the years her power has
gradually been curtailed, first, by Ireland seceding in 1921, and more recently by devolving
powers to Wales and Scotland.
6.1 A Voter-centric Perspective
In the absence of strong externalities, federations are vehicles for redistribution and must
be forced in one way or the other and are likely to be unstable. Voluntary formation of
a federation, then, as in Oates (1972), requires strong externalities. Our analysis suggests
that the logic leading to a stable federation differs significantly depending on whether
externalities are predominately negative or positive. In practice, two of the most funda-
mental reasons for the formation of a federation are defense and trade. The former is
an example of a positive externality insofar as joining forces can deliver more protection
at the same or lower cost. The latter is an example of a negative externality insofar as
each region in the absence of a trade agreement opts for beggar-thy-neighbor type trade
policy. Our model, then, suggests that the forces that pull or push regions apart act very
differently depending on the relative strength of the underlying defense and trade motive.
With negative externalities arising from, say, a trade motive, the strength of the ex-
ternality is the key driver of integration: a strong negative externality makes all regions
favor a federation and accept the loss of accountability that comes with it. Interestingly,
federations are more likely to form among regions of different sizes than among equal-sized
regions. This appears counter-intuitive at first, as one might expect that a small region
fears being dominated by a large counter-part if it joins a federation. But the reason
simply is that it is harder for the federal politician to extract rent in an asymmetric than
in a symmetric federation. A recent example of this is the wave of voluntary municipal-
ity mergers in Finland where many small municipalities were willing to merge with large
neighbors (Saarimaa and Tukiainen, 2015).
In contrast, a strong positive externality, arising from, say, a defense motive, is not
suffi cient to create a stable federation. The reason is that turnout uncertainty opens up
the door for redistribution through equilibrium selection, even among otherwise symmetric
regions. Depending on the distributional outcome, some regions may lose out and veto
integration even when externalities are strong or, if they are already in the federation,
attempt to secede.
6.2 A Politician-centric Perspective
We have so far ignored the interests of the regional politicians when making regime com-
parisons. In practice, however, regional politicians may have disproportionate influence on
integration decisions and be able to supersede the interests of the voters they represent.
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To consider this possibility, suppose that the fiscal architecture is decided by consent of
the two regional politicians, irrespective of what voters want, and that each perceives that
there is a probability qi, with
∑
i qi = 1, that he will become the “federal politician”.
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Given that, centralization cannot be voluntary if the externality is (weakly) positive. The
reason is that the total rent that can be extracted by the federal politician is equal to
the sum of the rents extracted by the two regional politicians. As a consequence, one of
them will lose by agreeing to a federation. With negative externalities, the situation is
very different. In this case, the aggregate rent that is extracted by the federal politician is
greater than the sum of the rents extracted by the two regional politicians. This implies
that federalism may be preferred to regionalism by all regional politicians, in particularly
so when the negative externality is strong. This is not because they have any interest in
internalizing these externalities, but because they can extract extra rent from voters in
this case. Combined with Proposition 4, this provides a very strong positive prediction:
in the presence of strong negative externalities, e.g., generated by uncoordinated trade
policy, all voters and all politicians support a federation. The same is not true for positive
externalities, e.g., generated by increasing returns to defense.
7 Conclusion and Discussion
We show how governance uncertainty —exemplified by turnout uncertainty —affects the
trade off between internalization of externalities and political accountability in the design
of the fiscal state. We highlight a novel asymmetry between positive and negative exter-
nalities. We show that centralization only weakens political accountability in the presence
of negative externalities. This yields two new insights. First, regionalism may Pareto
dominate federalism with negative externalities. This is not possible with positive exter-
nalities. Second, with positive externalities, federalism may not be Pareto effi cient despite
the fact that policy can be tailored to regional taste differences and federalism internalizes
the positive externality.
These results, however, ignore three potentially important issues. Firstly, we do not
consider the benefits of yardstick competition enabled by regionalism. As shown by Besley
and Case (1995), voters can use information about what is happening in other jurisdictions
to overcome political agency problems. This forces politicians into (yardstick) competition
in which they care about what other politicians do. This benefit is, of course, lost if fiscal
decisions are centralized. It would be interesting in future research to study the possibility
of yardstick competition. Another limitation of the analysis is the focus on the case with
two regions. It would be of interest in future work to study more regions. It would also
be interesting to consider the effects of inter-regional migration. As show by Kessler et al.
14If a regional politician has no chance of becoming the federal politician, he will veto any attempt at
creating a federation since he will lose his rent. Supplementary online appendix III contains the formal
analysis.
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(2011) this can have important implications for how citizens would vote in a referendum
on the design of the fiscal state.
Second, we ignore tax distortions and collection costs. In reality, taxation creates
deadweight cost and tax collection is costly. Our model can be extended to accommodate
endogenous distortionary taxation. All our results depend on whether the political cost
functions are sub- or super-additive. In the model presented above, this is determined
solely by the direction of the externality. This is also true in an economy with distortionary
taxation.15 The assumption of lump sum taxes and transfers greatly simplify our analysis,
but it does not do so at the expense of important insights.
Third, a more critical issue is that politicians in our model are perfect substitutes for
each other. Voters are, therefore, indifferent between any two candidates at each election.
Accordingly, they do not have a strict incentive to vote as they promised. In reality,
politicians differ in many ways and voters would like to select politicians with desirable
characteristics. This gives them a positive reason to keep reelection promises. This,
however, introduces an adverse selection problem and voters need, in general, to resort to
more complicated voting strategies along the lines of Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1998).
Hindriks and Lockwood (2009) consider an insightful two-period political agency with both
moral hazard and adverse selection. They show that centralization reduces the extent of
electoral accountability, as the rent seeking federal politician can target good behavior at a
“minimum winning coalition”of regions. At the same time, this makes it more profitable
for bad incumbents to pool with good ones, thus increasing the probability of electoral
discipline occurring at all. In our model, the strategic consensus result shots down the first
of these effects. The second effect will, we conjecture, operate if the total rent that can
be extracted in the federation is bigger than the rent that can be extracted in the regions.
This is the case with negative externalities, but not with positive ones.
We may conclude by noting that the general framework and the characterization results
in Aidt and Dutta (2004) can be adopted to many other applications than the one stud-
ied here. This includes other public finance problems, e.g., the choice between targeted
transfers and universal public goods (Aidt and Dutta, 2009). Applications in many other
fields, including corporate governance and labor economics, also come to mind.
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8 Supplementary Appendix I
This appendix reproduces and generalizes slightly Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 and 2
from Aidt and Dutta (2004). To prove the main characterization results, we must first
prove that all equilibria exhibits strategic consensus. We begin by introducing some extra
notation. Let x−i(xi) be the level of utility group −i obtains when the politician provides
utility level xi to group i at minimum cost without regard to the welfare of group −i.
Then, the following is true:
[B1] C(x1t, x2t (x1t)) = C1 (x1t)
[B2] C(x1t (x2t) , x2t) = C2 (x2t) .
A special case of this is when C(x1t, 0) = C1 (x1t) and C(0, x2t) = C2 (x2t) as assumed in
Aidt and Dutta (2004). We also assume that C(0, 0) = Ci(0) = 0, i = 1, 2. We can now
state the main Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Strategic Consensus) Assume that β ∈ (0, 1). Let xt = (x1t, x2t) be a
pair of performance standards set by the two groups of voters for period t and define
X = {xt}∞t=0 as a sequence of such standards. Let a∗t be the action implemented by the
politician in period t; define V0t(at) as the politician’s payoff.
1. A stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
2. Suppose (M), (K) and (C+) hold. Along any stationary equilibrium path, X satisfies
(SC+) V0t(11) = V0t(00) ≥ max{V0t(10), V0t(01)}.
Any sequence X satisfying (SC+) is a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
performance standards. Along any stationary equilibrium path, the politician chooses
a∗t = (11) at every t and he is reelected for sure.
16Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Austin Robinson Building, Sidgwick Avenue, Cam-
bridge CB3 9DD, Tel.: +44 1223 335231. E-mail: Toke.Aidt@econ.cam.ac.uk.
17Department of Economics, University of Birmingham. E-mail: J.Dutta@bham.ac.uk.
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3. Suppose (M), (K) and (C−) hold. Along any stationary equilibrium path, X satisfies
(SC−) V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) > V0t(00).
Any sequence X satisfying (SC−) is a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
performance standards. Along any stationary equilibrium path, the politician chooses
a∗t = (11) at every t and he is reelected for sure.
Corollary 3 Every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium path displays strategic
consensus at each t.
We prove the Theorem with a series of Lemmas. We begin by introducing some nota-
tion. Denote for each action at ∈ A, the politician’s payoff by V0t(at) and write
V0t(00) = T ; (21)
V0t(10) = T − C1(x1t) + p1βVt+1; (22)
V0t(01) = T − C2(x2t) + p2βVt+1; (23)
V0t(11) = T − C(x1t, x2t) + βVt+1. (24)
where Vt+1 > 0 is the value of being reelected at time t+1. Note that the politician is only
reelected with some probability (p1 or p2) if he chooses to be “partisan”and to satisfy one
of the standards only.
Now, suppose, in some period t, that the two groups of voters announce the standards
xt = {x1t, x2t}. Given these standards, the politician chooses an action from the set
{at ∈ A : arg maxat∈A V0t(at)}. If the politician is indifferent between two or more actions
in this set, he chooses the action that maximizes reelection chances. This is anticipated by
the two groups of voters when they, simultaneously, set their standards at the beginning
of the period. With these preliminary remarks we can state the first Lemma.
Lemma 1 Suppose that [M] and [K] hold. If the performance standards xt = {x1t, x2t}
constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at time t, then xt must satisfy
(E0) V0t(11) ≥ max{V0t(10), V0t(01), V0t(00)}.
Proof: We argue by contradiction. Suppose that x̃t = {x̃1t, x̃2t} constitutes a station-
ary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in performance standards and that
V0t(11) < max{V0t(10), V0t(01), V0t(00)}
at time t. There are four separate cases to consider. We show in each case that at least




V0t(10) = max{V0t(10), V0t(01), V0t(00)} > V0t(11)
or that
V0t(10) = V0t(00) = max{V0t(10), V0t(01), V0t(00)} > V0t(11).
Rewrite equations (22) and (24) to get
V0t(10)− V0t(11) = C(x1t, x2t)− C1(x1t)− p2βVt+1.
By [M] and [K], property [B1] implies that there must exist a x′2t > x2t such that
C(x̃1t, x
′
2t)− C1(x̃1t)− p2βVt+1 < 0.
This implies that group 2 can gain by announcing the standard x′2t instead of x̃2t.
2. Suppose, instead, that
V0t(01) = max{V0t(10), V0t(01), V0t(00)} > V0t(11)
or that
V0t(01) = V0t(00) = max{V0t(10), V0t(01), V0t(00)} > V0t(11).
By an argument similar to the previous case, there must exist a x′1t > x1t such that
C(x′1t, x̃2t)− C2(x̃2t)− p1βVt+1 < 0.
This implies that group 1 can gain by announcing the standard x′1t instead of x̃1t.
3. Suppose that
V0t(00) = max{V0t(10), V0t(01), V0t(00)} > V0t(11).
Rewrite equations (21) and (22) to get
V0t(00)− V0t(10) = C(x1t, x2t)− p1βVt+1.
By [M] and [K] there must exist a x′′1t > 0 such that
C(x′′1t, x2t)− p1βVt+1 < 0.
This implies that group 1 can at least gain x′′1t > 0 by announcing the standard x
′′
1t
instead of x̃1t. A similar argument can be made for group 2.
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4. Suppose that
V0t(10) = V0t(01) = max{V0t(10), V0t(01), V0t(00)} > V0t(11)
or
V0t(10) = V0t(01) = V0t(00) > V0t(11).
We need to consider two sub-cases. First, suppose the politician chooses at = (10).
We can then repeat the argument from case 1 to show that there exists a profitable
deviation for group 2. Second, suppose the politician chooses at = (01). We can then
repeat the argument from case 2 to show that there exists a profitable deviation for
group 1
Lemma 2 A pair of performance standards xt = (x1t, x2t) is a stationary subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium at time t if, and only if
(E1) V0t(11) = max{V0t(01), V0t(00)};
(E2) V0t(11) = max{V0t(10), V0t(00)}.
Proof: Suppose that p1 ≥ 12 . The per-period payoff of group 1 is
u1t = x1t if max{V0t(11), V0t(10)} ≥ max{V0t(01), V0t(00)};
u1t = x1t otherwise.
The per-period payoff of group 2 is
u2t = x2t if

V0t(11) ≥ max{V0t(10), V0t(00), V0t(01)}
V0t(01) > max{V0t(10), V0t(00), V0t(11)}
V0t(01) = V0t(00) > max{V0t(10), V0t(11)}
;
u2t = x2t otherwise.
Recall that C(x1t, x2t) and Ci(xit) are monotonically increasing in their arguments by [M].
Suppose that x̃t is a (stationary subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium. Then, by Lemma 1,
(E0) is satisfied by x̃t. It follows that the payoff of group 1 is maximized by the standard,
x1t, that satisfies (E1), and that the payoff of group 2 is maximized by the standard,
x2t, that satisfies (E2). Finally, notice that if (E1) and (E2) are satisfied by a set of
performance standards at time t, then these standards constitute a stationary subgame
perfect Nash Equilibrium. This completes the proof for the case with p1 ≥ 12 . The proof
for the case where p1 < 12 is similar and is omitted
The following two Lemmas explore the implications of assumptions (C+) and (C−),
respectively.
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Lemma 3 Conditions (E1), (E2), and (C+) hold at time t if, and only if
V0t(11) = V0t(00) ≥ max{V0t(10), V0t(01)}.
Proof: Note that (C+) implies that
(C0+) V0t(11) + V0t(00) ≥ V0t(10) + V0t(01)
at any t. We prove the Lemma by contradiction. Suppose V0t(11) > V0t(00). Condition
(E2) implies that
V0t(11) = V0t(10).
Substitute into (C0+) to get that
V0t(00) ≥ V0t(01).
Combing this with (E1) yields
V0t(11) ≤ V0t(00).
This is a contradiction, so V0t(11) cannot be greater than V0t(00). It follows directly from
(E1) that V0t(11) cannot be smaller than V0t(00). Finally, V0t(11) = V0t(00) is compatible
with (C0+), (E1), and (E2) only if V0t(10) ≤ V0t(00) and V0t(01) ≤ V0t(00)
The next Lemma considers the case of super-additive costs.
Lemma 4 Conditions (E1), (E2), and (C−) hold at time t if, and only if
V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) > V0t(00).
Proof: Note that (C−) implies that
(C0−) V0t(11) + V0t(00) < V0t(10) + V0t(01)
at any t. We begin by proving that V0t(11) = V0t(10). This is done by contradiction. First,
suppose that V0t(11) > V0t(10). (E2) implies that
V0t(00) > V0t(10).
Combining this with (C0−) implies that
V0t(11) < V0t(01).
However, (E1) implies that V0t(11) ≥ V0t(01). This is a contradiction, so V0t(11) cannot
be greater than V0t(10). Second, suppose that V0t(10) > V0t(11). (E2) implies that
V0t(11) ≥ V0t(10);
This is a contradiction, and so V0t(10) cannot be greater than V0t(11). We conclude
that V0t(10) = V0t(11). The proof that V0t(01) = V0t(11) is similar and omitted. Finally,
V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) is compatible with (C0−) only if V0t(11) = V0t(10) = V0t(01) >
V0t(00)
The last Lemma establishes that a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists.
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Lemma 5 A stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists for all β ∈ (0, 1).
Proof: Suppose first that (C+) holds. In this case, a stationary equilibrium x̂ =
{x̂1, x̂2} satisfies (SC+) at every t. This implies
T − C(x̂1, x̂2)
1− β = T ; (25)
and that






Equation (25) rewrites as
C(x̂1, x̂2) = βT.
Equilibrium levels of x̂ satisfy








It follows from conditions (C+), (M) and (K) that there exists a solution to equations
(26) and (27).
Suppose instead that (C−) holds. In this case, a stationary equilibrium x̄ = {x̄1, x̄2}
must satisfy












T − C(x̄1, x̄2)
1− β > T. (30)
Define the quantities x11, x12, x21, x22 as solutions to equations (28) and (29) when x1 = x1
and x2 = x2 respectively. Then,
T − C(x11, x2)
1− β =
T − C(x11, x2)
1− p1β
;








T − C(x1, x22)
1− β =




Solving these equations yields





whenever β ∈ (0, 1). It follows that a solution to equations (28) and (29) exists.
Additionally, if x̄ satisfies equations (28) and (29), then restriction (30) holds for all
β ∈ (0, 1). To show that an equilibrium exists for all β ∈ (0, 1), rewrite equations (28) and
(29) as
Tθ = (1 + θ)C(x̄1, x̄2)− C(x̄1, x2);
Tη = (1 + η)C(x̄1, x̄2)− C(x1, x̄2);
where θ = p2β
1−β and η =
p1β
1−β . Adding the two equations, we obtain
(θ + η)(T − C(x̄1, x̄2))− C(x̄1, x̄2) = C(x̄1, x̄2)− C(x̄1, x2)− C(x1, x̄2) > 0 (31)
by [C-]. Note that θ + η = β
1−β and that (31) implies
C(x̄1, x̄2) < βT
as assumed
Based on this fundamental result, it is relatively straight forward to prove Propositions
1 and 2 in the main text.
Proof of Proposition 1. The value of reelection starting from any period t is V0t =
max[V0t(01), V0t(10), V0t(11), V0t(00)]. We obtain from Lemma 3 and equation (21) that
V0t = V0t(00) = T . This implies that
V0t+1 = T.
We obtain, from Theorem 1 and equations (21) to (24), that
V0t(11) = V0t(00)⇒ C(x1t, x2t) = βT ;
and that
V0t(00) ≥ V0t(10)⇒ C1(x1t) ≥ βp1T ;
V0t(00) ≥ V0t(01)⇒ C2(x2t) ≥ βp2T.
32
The politician’s per period payoff is T − C(x1t, x2t) = (1 − β)T . Moreover, suppose
C(x1t, x2t) = C1(x1t)+C2(x2t). Then, there exist a unique stationary equilibrium, x1t = x∗1
and x2t = x∗2, with
C1(x
∗




Proof of Proposition 2. The value of reelection starting from any period t is V0t =
max[V0t(01), V0t(10), V0t(11), V0t(00)]. We obtain from Lemma 4 that V0t = V0t(11) for all




βk(T − C(x1t+k, x2t+k)).
For sequences of stationary standards, we get
V0t = V0t+1 =
T − C(x1, x2)
1− β .
Substituting for V0t+1 =
T−C(x1,x2)
1−β , we get that
V0t(11) = V0t(10)⇒ (SC−1 )
and
V0t(11) = V0t(01)⇒ (SC−2 ).
Finally, V0t =
T−C(x1,x2)
1−β for all t implies that the politician gets T − C(x1, x2) per pe-
riod. This is strictly greater than (1 − β)T because V0t(11) > V0t(00) by Lemma 4. For
uniqueness, see Proposition 3 in Aidt and Dutta (2004)
9 Supplementary Appendix II
In this appendix, we solves the planner’s problem, derive the political cost function under
federalism and give suffi cient conditions for the case with si > 0 at the equilibrium.
The planner’s problem We focus on the case where si > 0 at the optimum. We assume
that the planner maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function with equal weight on each










−i + si) (32)
subject to nisi+ki ≤ Ti. For si > 0, we can substitute the constraint and find the optimal




i . We note that s
R∗
i > 0 if Ti > n
2
i . Evaluating the social welfare
function at the optima gives
SWRi = ni(2ni − 2γn−i) + Ti − n2i . (33)
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1 + s2) (34)
subject to k1 + k2 + n1s1 + n2s2 ≤ T1 + T2. For si > 0 all i, we can substitute the revenue
constraint and find that kF
∗
i = (ni − n−iγ)2 under the assumption that γ ∈ (−1, n2n1 ).
Since utility is linear in income and transfers, utilitarian social welfare is unaffected by the
distribution of the tax revenues not spent on providing local public goods. To ensure that
sF
∗
i > 0 for all i, we require T1 + T2 >
∑
i(ni − n−iγ)2.
Social welfare under [F] cannot be lower than the sum of regional social welfare under
[R] because the federal planner can decide to replicate what the two regional planners do.
For γ 6= 0, it is strictly larger. This implies that it, in principle, is possible to design a
transfer policy that will make both regions weakly better off under [F] than under [R]. To
see how, let T n be the net federal tax revenue left over after paying for local public goods,
i.e.,




2 = T1 + T2 − ((1 + γ2)(n21 + n22)− 4γn1n2). (35)
Let σi denote the share of the net surplus allocated to region i. For each region, we




n1 − 2γn2 + 2γ2n1
)
− T1 (36)
∆∗2(σ1) = (1− σ1)T n + n2
(
n2 − 2γn1 + 2γ2n2
)
− T2. (37)
Define the share of total revenue that makes region 1 indifferent between joining the
utilitarian federation (∆∗1 = 0) as
σ∗1 =
T1 − n1 (n1 − 2γn2 + 2γ2n1)
T1 + T2 − ((1 + γ2)(n21 + n22)− 4γn1n2)
. (38)











and strictly better off if there is an externality. We need to check that σ∗1 > 0 such that
both regions get a subsidy. That requires that
T1 > n1
(





We assume that this is the case and note that this is suffi cient to ensure that it is possible
to find a transfer policy that will make [F] Pareto superior to [R] in the presence of an
externality.
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The political cost function under federalism Suppose the politician wants to satisfy




















Under the assumption that γ < n2
n1
, k1 and k2 are (weakly) positive at the optimum. In
the text, we focus on the case in which both groups get transfers, but for completeness,
we give the details for all four possible cases:
1. s1 > 0, s2 > 0
2. s1 = s2 = 0
3. s1 = 0, s2 > 0
4. s1 > 0, s2 = 0
Case 1: Substituting the two constraints, which must be binding at the optimum, into















Solving this, we get k1 = (n1 − n2γ)2 and k 2 = (n2 − n1γ)2. The per capita transfers are










Notice that si > 0 requires that xi > 2ni (1 + γ2)− 4γn−i. The political cost function is

















Case 2: This case applies for x1 ≤ n1 (1 + γ2)−2γn2 and x2 ≤ n2 (1 + γ2)−2γn1. We need









or γ < 0 and min {x1, x2} > 0. Then, both constraints are binding and we can solve












and the cost function is











Notice that C (0, 0) = 0. Secondly, suppose that the constraint for group 1 is not binding.










for x1 ≤ −γx2.
Second, if γ < 0, the politician solves

















1 υ = 0
Solving for k1 and k2 and substituting into the constraint yields
υ =
x2
2 (1 + γ2)










for x2 ≥ 0. The political cost
function is
C (x1, x2) =
(
x2









4 (1 + γ2)
for x1 < 0.
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Third, suppose that the constraint for group 2 is not binding. By analogy, we get for γ ≥ 0










for x2 ≤ −γx1.
For γ < 0, we get
C (x1, x2) =
x21
4 (1 + γ2)
for x2 < 0.
Case 3: Substituting s2 out from the beginning, we can write the Lagrangian function
as









































2 = 0. (43)
Solve equations (41) and (42) to get
k1 = (ψ − n2γ)2
k2 = (n2 − γψ)2 .

















x1 + 2γn2 (1− γ2)










2n2 (1− γ2)− γx1
2 (1 + γ2)
)2
s2 = x2 − 2
(
2n2 (1− γ2)− γx1




x1 + 2γn2 (1− γ2)
2 (1 + γ2)
)
and the political cost function is
C (x1, x2) =
(
x1 + 2γn2 (1− γ2)




2n2 (1− γ2)− γx1






2n2 (1− γ2)− γx1




x1 + 2γn2 (1− γ2)




We notice that s2 > 0 requires that x2 >
2(n2(1−2γ2+γ4)−γx1)
(1+γ2)
. For x1 ≤ 4γn2, ψ = 0. The









For γ ≥ 0, k1 = 0 and k2 = (n2)2 and the cost function is
C (x1, x2) = (n2)
2 + n2 (x2 − 2n2) .
For γ < 0, k2 = (n2)
2 and k1 = (γn2)
2 and the cost function is
C (x1, x2) = (n2)
2 (1 + γ2) + n2
(
x2 − 2n2(1 + γ2)
)
.









2n1 (1− γ2)− γx2










x1 + 2γn1 (1− γ2)
2 (1 + γ2)
)2
s1 = x1 − 2
(
2n1 (1− γ2)− γx2




x2 + 2γn1 (1− γ2)
2 (1 + γ2)
)
and the political cost function is
C (x1, x2) =
(
x1 + 2γn1 (1− γ2)




2n1 (1− γ2)− γx2






2n1 (1− γ2)− γx2




x2 + 2γn1 (1− γ2)
2 (1 + γ2)
))
.
We notice that s1 > 0 requires that x1 >
2(n1(1−2γ2+γ4)−γx2)
(1+γ2)
. For x2 ≤ 4γn1, ψ = 0. For
γ ≥ 0, k2 = 0 and k1 = (n1)2 and the cost function is
C (x1, x2) = (n1)
2 + n1 (x1 − 2n1) .
For γ < 0, k1 = (n1)
2 and k2 = (γn1)
2 and the cost function is
C (x1, x2) = (n1)
2 (1 + γ2) + n1
(
x1 − 2n1(1 + γ2)
)
.
Now, suppose that the politician will only try to satisfy the demands of group i. Again,
we give details for the possible cases, but in the text, we focus on the case with positive
transfers:
1. si > 0.
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2. si = 0.
Case 1: The politician solves
min
ki,k−i,si
ki + k−i + nisi






−i. The optimal choice is
ki = (ni)
2 and k−i = 0 for γ ≥ 0
and
ki = (ni)
2 and k−i = (niγ)




xi − 2ni for γ ≥ 0
xi − 2ni(1 + γ2) for γ < 0




2 + ni(xi − 2ni) for γ ≥ 0
(1 + γ2) (ni)
2 + ni(xi − 2ni(1 + γ2)) for γ < 0
.
Notice that for γ ≥ 0, xi > 2ni for si > 0 and for γ < 0, xi > ni2(1 + γ2) for si > 0.










for x−i ≤ −γxi.




















−i χ = 0.
Solving for k1 and k2 and substituting into the constraint yields
χ =
xi
2 (1 + γ2)
,
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4 (1 + γ2)
for xi < 0.
In the text, we focus on the case where, at equilibrium, the politician offers local
public goods and transfers. This requires that tax revenues are suffi ciently large. More
specifically, it requires the following.
1. Under [R], each regional politician spends ki = (ni)
2 and xit−2ni+2γn−i on transfers.




− ni + 2(ni − γn−i).





for i = 1, 2.
2. Under [F], two cases can arise. For γ ≥ 0, we can, using Proposition 2, write the









2 + γ (1− βp2) (γn21 − 4n1n2 + γn22)
n2
The transfers are














n2i (1 + γ








2 + ni(xi − 2ni(1 + γ2)) = βpiT.
Solving this yields xit = 1ni (Tβpi + n
2
i (γ































n2i (1 + γ
2 (1 + βpi))− 4βγn1n2pi + n2−iγ2 (1− βpi)
βpi
}




for i = 1, 2.
10 Supplementary Appendix III
This appendix studies the incentive of regional politicians to join a federation in the pres-
ence of negative externalities. We consider the case with two identical regions: pi = 12 ,
n1 = n2 = 1 and T1 = T2 = 12T . The rent, R
F , extracted by the federal politician is




βT + 1 + 2γ(1− 1
2
β)(γ − 2) for i = 1, 2. (44)
Substitution yields
RF = (1− β)T + 2γ (1− β) (2− γ) . (45)
The politician of region i prefers federalism to regionalism if qiRF > 12 (1− β)T . A














Substitution of RF into equation (47) yields the threshold value q1 that makes the regional




(1− β)T + 2γ (1− β) (2− γ)
(1− β)T + 2γ (1− β) (2− γ) . (48)






(1− β)T + 2γ (1− β) (2− γ)





(T + 4γ − 2γ2) > 0. (49)
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Then, for q1 such that
q1 > q1 > 1− q1 (50)
both politicians prefer [F] to [R] This implies that there exist values of q1 such that both





(T + 4γ − 2γ2)2
> 0 (51)
for γ < n2
n1
< 1. Hence, the threshold q1 is increasing in the strength of the externality
and the two regional politicians are most likely to consent to a federation if externalities
are strong.
11 Supplementary Appendix IV
Our results regarding the costs and benefits of fiscal centralization derive from the funda-
mental properties of the political cost functions in the federation. This appendix presents
an extension of the baseline model which allows for endogenous distortionary taxation. We
show that the political cost function is super-additive with negative externalities (γ > 0)
and sub-additive with positive externalities (γ < 0), as in the baseline model. As a conse-
quence, the key insight from the baseline model that the direction of the externality creates
an asymmetry in the costs and benefits of centralization carries over to the economy with
distortionary taxation.
11.1 Economic structure
The utility and production structure is as in the baseline model but income in the two
regions are subject to a proportional tax τ it and
uit = yi(1− τ it) + git − γg−it. (52)
The parameter γ ∈ (−1, n2
n1
) captures the strength of the externality. Public goods are
produced by the technology git = 2
√
kit. We introduce a leaky bucket assumption and,
as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, pp. 100-101), the tax distortion is captured by an
aggregate cost coming out of the government budget. More specifically, the revenue raised
from region i at time t is
Tit = niyiτ it − d(τ it)niyi (53)
where the deadweight cost function d (τ it) is increasing in the tax rate at an increasing






This also implies that the revenue maximizing tax rates are 1. We can write the maximum
revenue that can be collected from region i as Tmaxit =
1
2
niyit and the total amount that can





niyit. The choice variables of the federal
politician are {τ it, git} for i = 1, 2. That is, the tax rates can be region-specific. We omit
time subscripts in the following. For simplicity and without any loss of insights, we impose
the assumption that the income per capita in the two regions is equal to 1 to simplify some
of the welfare differentials.
11.2 Political cost functions in the federation
For a federal politician, the political cost of satisfying the two standards announced by the
voters in the two regions is the difference between the maximum rent that can be extracted
(Tmax) and the actual rent extracted given compliance with the standards, (r(x1, x2) =∑
i
(Ti − ki)):
cF (x1, x2) = T
max − r(x1, x2) = Tmax + k1 + k2 − T1 − T2. (55)
The political cost function is the minimum cost required to meet the standards and is
defined as
CF (x1, x2) = min c
F (x1, x2) (56)
subject to for i = 1, 2
nixi ≤ ni
(







τ i ∈ [0, 1]. (58)
Let the Lagrangian multipliers on the two incentive compatibility constraints be λ1 and
λ2, respectively, and assume that the tax rates are interior (to be verified below). We can







λi = 1− τ i (60)
nixi = ni
(










































n2 + y1y2 (64)
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k∗1 = (λ1n1 − γλ2n2)
2 = ((1− τ 1)n1 − γ (1− τ 2)n2)2 (65)
k∗2 = (λ2n2 − γλ1n1)
2 = ((1− τ 2)n2 − γ (1− τ 1)n1)2 . (66)
By inspection of equations (62) and (63), τ ∗i ≤ 1 for γ > 0. For γ < 0, we require that











with B1 − B2 = A4γn1(2n2(1+γ2)+y2) < 0. If x1 < B1x2, then τ
∗
1 = 1 and if x1 > B2x2, then
τ ∗2 = 1 and the optimal public goods levels are adjusted accordingly. Substitution of the
solution into the objective function and imposing the assumption that y1 = y2 = 1 give
the political cost function for τ i ∈ (0, 1)
CF (x1, x2) =
(n1 (2n2(1 + γ
2) + 1) x21 + 8γn1n2x1x2 + n2 (2n1(1 + γ
2) + 1) x22)




4 (γ4 − 2γ2 + 1)n1n2 (n1 + n2) + 2 (γ2 + 1) (n1 + n2)2 + n1 + n2
)
8 (γ4 − 2γ2 + 1)n1n2 + 4 (1 + γ2) (n1 + n2) + 2
+Tmax.
Next, we calculate the political costs of satisfying the voters in just one region. The
political cost function is defined as
CF (xi) = minT











τ i ∈ [0, 1]. (73)












. The political cost function is
C+ (xi) = T


























. The political cost function is
C− (xi) = T










x2i − 2niyi(1 + γ2)− y2i
4ni(1 + γ2) + 2yi
ni.
We can now evaluate the additiveness of the political cost functions. To simply the
expressions, we impose the assumption that y1 = y2 = 1. For a negative externality
(γ > 0), we find that
∆C+ = CF (x1, x2)− C+ (x1)− C+ (x2)
=
(4n2n1 (2n1 + 1) (2n2 + 1)x1x2 + n
2
1γ (2n2 + 1) (2n2(3− γ2)− 1)x21)
1 + 2(1 + γ2)(n1 + n2) + 4n1n2(1 + γ4 − 2γ2) (2n2 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
γ (76)
+
n22γ (2n1 + 1) (2n1(3− γ2)− 1)x22γ
1 + 2(1 + γ2)(n1 + n2) + 4n1n2(1 + γ4 − 2γ2) (2n2 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
> 0 for γ ∈ [0, 1).
So, the political cost function is super-additive for negative externalities.
For a positive externality (γ < 0), we find, under the assumption that the tax rates
are interior and y1 = y2 = 1, the following







4 (2 (1 + γ2) (n1 + n2) + 4n1n2(1− 2γ2 + γ4) + 1)D2D1
(77)
where Di = 2ni(1 + γ2) + 1. We requires
B1x2 < x1 < B2x2 (78)





4 (2 (1 + γ2) (n1 + n2) + 4n1n2(1− 2γ2 + γ4) + 1)D2D1
> 0
for x1 < B2x2. The sign of ∆C− is equal to -sign(2n1γD2x21 + 2n2γD1x
2
2 +D1D2x1x2).
Evaluate this at the upper bound i.e., at x1 = B2x2 which gives
−4 (γ




2 ((γ2 + 1)n2 + 1 (2n1(1 + γ
2) + 1) x22
8γn1
> 0 for γ ∈ (−1, 0) .
This implies that ∆C− < 0 and the political cost function is sub-additive.
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Unlike in the baseline model, we observe that the political cost functions in the economy
which distortionary taxation are quadratic in x1 and x2. This makes it cumbersome to
derive closed form solutions which can be used as an input to the welfare analysis of
federalism versus regionalism. However, qualitatively the main results will care over to the
more complex economy. This is because the key drivers behind them are i) the political
cost functions are super-additive with negative externality leading to the rent effect; and
ii) the utility allocation is not unique with a sub-additive political cost function. These
properties are preserved in the more complex economy with distortionary taxation.
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